When political goals override security strategy

Yang Uk

The author is a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies

From the outset, the Lee Jae Myung administration has described itself as a pragmatic government. The principle of placing national interests above ideology is broadly appealing. Yet pragmatism should be more than a political slogan. It must serve as a governing philosophy expressed through national and defense strategy. True pragmatism requires a clear-eyed assessment of reality, an honest understanding of a country's capabilities and limitations, and policy choices based on national interests. From that perspective, several recent defense initiatives raise concerns because political objectives appear to be taking precedence over strategic considerations.

The security environment on the Korean Peninsula is deteriorating more rapidly than at any point since the end of the Cold War. North Korea has gained valuable battlefield experience through the Russia-Ukraine war while rapidly incorporating advanced military technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence. Military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow has evolved beyond weapons transactions into technology transfers and the modernization of warfighting systems. Strategic coordination among North Korea, China and Russia has also deepened. By integrating nuclear and conventional capabilities, North Korea is building a new model of warfare that poses an increasingly complex challenge to South Korea's security.

Despite these developments, the government's defense agenda appears driven more by political timetables than by military realities. The clearest example is its goal of completing the transfer of wartime operational control (Opcon) from the United States to South Korea within President Lee's five-year term.

The transfer of Opcon is an important objective that South Korea should eventually achieve. The question is not whether it should happen but when. The answer should depend on military readiness rather than the political calendar. Before assuming wartime command, Korea must demonstrate that it possesses the combined command capabilities, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, missile defense systems and integrated nuclear-conventional operational framework needed to lead the early stages of a conflict. Decisions on Opcon should follow the military's timetable, not the government's.

An even greater concern is that an accelerated transfer could weaken the deterrent effect of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. The second Donald Trump administration has urged allies to assume a greater share of conventional defense responsibilities. Accommodating Washington's requests, however, is not the same as protecting South Korea's national interests. Seoul must first determine whether such changes genuinely strengthen its own security. Otherwise, South Korea could regain wartime operational control while simultaneously reducing its ability to deter North Korean aggression.

The proposal to merge the Army, Navy and Air Force academies into a single institution reinforces these concerns. While the Army is primarily a force defined by its size, the Navy and Air Force rely heavily on technological expertise and specialized professional education. Any reform that sacrifices those strengths in the name of efficiency risks causing greater losses than gains.

The distinctive cultures and expertise of each service begin developing from the earliest years at their respective academies. They cannot simply be replaced by short-term branch-specific training after a common curriculum. Reducing four years of specialized education into a single integrated program would not strengthen joint operations. Instead, it would erode the professional foundations upon which effective joint operations depend.

Jointness has never meant making the three services identical. It has always meant allowing each branch to maximize its unique strengths before integrating them into a unified fighting force. Weakening those foundations while simultaneously pursuing Opcon transfer would likely diminish, rather than reinforce, the alliance's overall deterrence.

The debate over nuclear-powered submarines likewise demands a realistic assessment. Such vessels would undoubtedly provide significant strategic value. Yet without U.S. technology cooperation and nuclear fuel support, they are unlikely to become operational within a realistic time frame. Meanwhile, South Korea's globally competitive conventional submarine industry risks losing momentum as policymakers focus on ambitions that remain beyond immediate reach.

That concern is no longer theoretical. South Korean companies recently failed to secure Canada's submarine procurement project, valued at roughly 60 trillion won ($40.8 billion). The setback should be viewed not merely as the loss of a contract but as a warning about long-term competitiveness. Prolonged uncertainty surrounding the nuclear submarine initiative could undermine technological development, industrial continuity and the Navy's broader shipbuilding plans. The growth of South Korea's defense industry should be guided by long-term industrial strategy rather than political achievement.

Ultimately, national defense is not an arena for political symbolism but the foundation of national survival. No security strategy can succeed without leadership that commands professional expertise and public trust. If the government truly intends to pursue pragmatic security policies, it must first restore confidence in its leadership. Questions surrounding alleged leaks of sensitive information related to North Korea and unresolved controversy over the defense minister's military service records must be addressed before appeals to pragmatism can carry real credibility.

Security cannot be safeguarded through determination alone. It depends upon careful preparation, realistic planning and sustained investment in professional capability. The same is true of pragmatism. Only by confronting reality, respecting expertise and maintaining a consistent national strategy can South Korea build a durable security posture. That remains one of the enduring lessons of the Korean War, and one the country would be wise to remember today.