NEC reform must balance independence and accountability

Lee Sun-woo

The author is a professor of political science and international relations at Jeonbuk National University.

The shortage of ballots during the June 3 local elections created a crisis few could have imagined. People were unable to vote because polling stations ran out of papers, a clear violation of voting rights. The frustration and anger of many citizens, particularly younger voters in their 20s and 30s, are entirely understandable. The National Assembly is preparing both a parliamentary investigation and a special counsel probe. The causes of the election management failure must be thoroughly uncovered and anyone found guilty of corruption or gross negligence should be held legally accountable.

Yet the investigation cannot be the end of the story. If legal responsibility is assigned while leaving the National Election Commission (NEC) structure intact as is, similar failures could recur. Weaknesses in the NEC have long been recognized, but reform has been delayed because of its constitutional status. Structural change is now just as important as determining responsibility.

As a constitutional institution, the NEC enjoys independence comparable to that of the judiciary. Following the fraudulent March 15 presidential election in 1960, election administration was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior and Safety to an independent election commission through constitutional revision. Since then, the NEC has not been subject to audits by the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI). Although it can be examined through parliamentary inspections, those reviews are too limited in time and scope to provide meaningful oversight. Allegations of hiring irregularities that generated widespread public outrage also reflected this lack of effective external scrutiny.

Allowing the executive branch to audit the NEC would also raise constitutional concerns. Just as the BAI does not inspect the judiciary, auditing the election watchdog could undermine its independence. Likewise, transferring some of its responsibilities to the Interior Ministry would likely fuel election-related controversies. Establishing another oversight agency solely to monitor the NEC is equally unrealistic. One theoretical alternative would be transferring the BAI to the National Assembly to strengthen legislative oversight, but that too would require constitutional revision.

The practical solution is therefore to preserve the NEC's constitutional independence while strengthening its democratic accountability. Independence without accountability risks becoming unrestrained autonomy.

In liberal democracies, even institutions that serve as neutral referees cannot be completely insulated from democratic control. Otherwise, the classic question inevitably arises: Who watches the watchdog? Independence is not an end in itself but a means of protecting fairness and political neutrality. Most democracies, therefore, seek an appropriate balance between institutional independence and democratic accountability.

Germany offers one example. Federal judges enjoy lengthy terms and broad autonomy in judicial decisions and court administration, protecting judicial independence. At the same time, they are selected jointly by the parliament and the state governments, ensuring democratic legitimacy and accountability. Because meaningful external supervision after appointment is limited, democratic control is exercised primarily through a rigorous appointment process.

Once appointed, Germany's highest judges exercise final judicial authority and bear corresponding responsibility. If serious judicial failures or widespread corruption were to emerge, responsibility would ultimately fall on the judiciary's leadership. That expectation encourages them to maintain fairness, integrity and transparency throughout the court system.

Interestingly, Korea's Constitution already provides the NEC with an appointment structure resembling that of the Constitutional Court rather than the ordinary judiciary. Nominations for the nine members of the commission are split equally among the National Assembly, the president and the chief justice of the Supreme Court, and candidates must undergo rigorous parliamentary confirmation hearings. Their fairness, integrity and professional qualifications are scrutinized at a level comparable to constitutional justices. The NEC chair is then elected from among the commissioners, traditionally a sitting Supreme Court justice.

The real problem lies elsewhere. Although the commissioners are appointed through a politically accountable process, they do not exercise meaningful operational authority. With the exception of one standing commissioner, even the chair serves only part-time. Day-to-day administration, personnel decisions and budget management are reportedly concentrated in the hands of the secretary general. Responsibility rests with commissioners who have little practical authority, while real power is exercised by an official who undergoes no comparable public scrutiny.

Such an imbalance weakens accountability at every level. Commissioners, lacking meaningful authority, have less incentive to regard their responsibilities seriously. Meanwhile, career officials within the NEC may mistake constitutional independence for protection from outside scrutiny, encouraging lax discipline and moral hazard.

Reform should therefore begin by correcting this governance structure. Commissioners appointed by the legislature, the presidency and the judiciary should exercise genuine authority while bearing clear responsibility for the commission's performance. Membership should not be limited to judges. Individuals with the qualifications, expertise and democratic legitimacy necessary to represent the public interest should also be eligible to serve.

Fortunately, this does not require a constitutional amendment but only a statutory revision. Preserving the NEC's independence while making democratic accountability work in practice should be the first priority. Once authority and responsibility are aligned, additional reforms will be easier to implement, and public confidence in election administration can be restored.